{
 "meta": {
  "provider": "gemini",
  "model": "gemini-3.6-flash",
  "version": "1.2.10",
  "commit": "3bb6a67a",
  "date": "2026-10-31 05:21 UTC",
  "rounds": 1,
  "note": "Built from main 3bb6a67a, the v1.2.10 code before the release commit; the image carried no version label."
 },
 "stopped": null,
 "summary": {
  "held_out": {
   "runs": 9,
   "incidents": 8,
   "root_cause": 8,
   "strict": 8,
   "lenient": 8,
   "commit_expected": 6,
   "commit_correct": 6,
   "distractor_blamed": 0,
   "healthy": 1,
   "healthy_silent": 1,
   "mean_alerting": 1.0,
   "errors": 0,
   "cost_usd": 0.0066,
   "mean_seconds": 41.9
  },
  "all": {
   "runs": 9,
   "incidents": 8,
   "root_cause": 8,
   "strict": 8,
   "lenient": 8,
   "commit_expected": 6,
   "commit_correct": 6,
   "distractor_blamed": 0,
   "healthy": 1,
   "healthy_silent": 1,
   "mean_alerting": 1.0,
   "errors": 0,
   "cost_usd": 0.0066,
   "mean_seconds": 41.9
  }
 },
 "results": [
  {
   "id": "h01_connection_leak",
   "set": "held_out",
   "category": "bad deploy",
   "name": "Connection leak on an error path (pool size unchanged)",
   "round": 1,
   "provider": "gemini",
   "model": "gemini-3.6-flash",
   "ai_called": true,
   "error": null,
   "seconds": 35.5,
   "cost_usd": 0.000855,
   "tokens_input": 5858,
   "tokens_output": 1386,
   "issues": [
    {
     "severity": "CRITICAL",
     "confidence": "HIGH",
     "component": "inventory-api",
     "affected_services": [],
     "description": "Database connection pool exhaustion in inventory-api causing SQLAlchemy QueuePool TimeoutError on reservation attempts.",
     "root_cause": "Commit 4b0e77d1 removed the context manager ('with self.db.session() as s:') in inventory/stock.py and replaced it with manual session handling. When 'row.available < qty' evaluates to true, an OutOfStock exception is raised before 's.close()' is executed, causing database connections to leak on every failed reservation until the QueuePool limit of 40 is exhausted.",
     "recommendation": "Refactor StockService.reserve in inventory/stock.py to use a context manager ('with self.db.session() as s:') or ensure 's.close()' is executed inside a try...finally block. Restart inventory-api to clear leaked connections.",
     "linked_commits": [
      {
       "sha": "4b0e77d1",
       "provider": "unknown",
       "project_id": null
      }
     ],
     "reasoning": "1. Observed database pool connection checkout count steadily increase from 14 to 38 connections in inventory-api warnings before triggering TimeoutError at 14:36:00.\n2. Examined commit 4b0e77d1 in inventory/stock.py which changed session management in StockService.reserve().\n3. Confirmed that raising OutOfStock(sku) bypasses s.close(), causing unclosed DB sessions to leak and deplete the QueuePool."
    }
   ],
   "answer": {
    "services": [
     "inventory-api"
    ],
    "cause": [
     [
      "leak",
      "not closed",
      "never closed",
      "stays open",
      "left open",
      "not released",
      "never released",
      "not returned",
      "close"
     ]
    ],
    "blame_sha": "4b0e77d1",
    "wrong_shas": [
     "9c1d2e3f"
    ],
    "max_issues": 2,
    "benign_max": null,
    "decoy_services": []
   },
   "score": {
    "verdict": true,
    "root_cause": true,
    "lenient": true,
    "checks": {
     "detected": true,
     "top service": true,
     "top cause": true,
     "top commit": true,
     "not blamed 9c1d2e3": true,
     "focused": true
    },
    "kind": "incident",
    "alerting": 1,
    "commit_expected": true
   }
  },
  {
   "id": "h02_retry_storm",
   "set": "held_out",
   "category": "bad deploy",
   "name": "Retry storm from a client change overloads a healthy service",
   "round": 1,
   "provider": "gemini",
   "model": "gemini-3.6-flash",
   "ai_called": true,
   "error": null,
   "seconds": 35.3,
   "cost_usd": 0.000781,
   "tokens_input": 4565,
   "tokens_output": 1462,
   "issues": [
    {
     "severity": "CRITICAL",
     "confidence": "HIGH",
     "component": "product-page",
     "affected_services": [
      "ratings-svc"
     ],
     "description": "Commit e5a91b02 modified retry settings in product-page to 10 attempts with 0ms fixed delay, triggering a retry storm that saturated ratings-svc request queue and spiked node CPU to 99%.",
     "root_cause": "Commit e5a91b02 in web/src/clients/ratings.ts increased retry attempts from 3 to 10 and removed exponential backoff/jitter in favor of a fixed 0ms delay. When ratings-svc experienced slight latency, product-page immediately flooded ratings-svc with rapid zero-delay retries. This created a severe retry storm, driving ratings-svc CPU to 99%, filling its 1024-request queue, and resulting in 503 Service Unavailable responses across 2,600 trace spans.",
     "recommendation": "Revert commit e5a91b02 in product-page to restore exponential backoff with jitter and reduce the max retry attempts back to 3.",
     "linked_commits": [
      {
       "sha": "e5a91b02",
       "provider": "unknown",
       "project_id": null
      }
     ],
     "reasoning": "1. Observed product-page warning logs repeating 20 times for ratings retries (attempt 1/10) starting at 14:30:00, followed immediately by ratings-svc 503 request queue full errors.\n2. Correlated the timing with commit e5a91b02 deployed at 14:26:00, which changed web/src/clients/ratings.ts backoff from exponential with jitter to a fixed 0ms delay with 10 attempts.\n3. Cross-referenced system metrics showing ratings-svc CPU reaching 99% and 2,600 error spans, confirming zero-delay retries caused a retry storm that overwhelmed ratings-svc."
    }
   ],
   "answer": {
    "services": [
     "product-page"
    ],
    "cause": [
     [
      "retry",
      "retries",
      "retrying"
     ],
     [
      "backoff",
      "back-off",
      "storm",
      "amplif",
      "10 attempts",
      "attempts",
      "delay"
     ]
    ],
    "blame_sha": "e5a91b02",
    "wrong_shas": [],
    "max_issues": 2,
    "benign_max": null,
    "decoy_services": []
   },
   "score": {
    "verdict": true,
    "root_cause": true,
    "lenient": true,
    "checks": {
     "detected": true,
     "top service": true,
     "top cause": true,
     "top commit": true,
     "focused": true
    },
    "kind": "incident",
    "alerting": 1,
    "commit_expected": true
   }
  },
  {
   "id": "h03_kafka_rebalance",
   "set": "held_out",
   "category": "config",
   "name": "Kafka consumer rebalance loop after a poll-size change",
   "round": 1,
   "provider": "gemini",
   "model": "gemini-3.6-flash",
   "ai_called": true,
   "error": null,
   "seconds": 43.8,
   "cost_usd": 0.000862,
   "tokens_input": 4732,
   "tokens_output": 1691,
   "issues": [
    {
     "severity": "CRITICAL",
     "confidence": "HIGH",
     "component": "order-events-consumer",
     "affected_services": [
      "fulfilment"
     ],
     "description": "The order-events-consumer service is experiencing repeated consumer poll timeouts and CommitFailedException errors during Kafka offset commits, stalling message consumption and causing the downstream fulfilment service to receive no paid orders for over 18 minutes.",
     "root_cause": "Commit 71f0c3aa modified consumer/src/main/resources/application.yaml to increase max-poll-records from 500 to 5000. Processing 5000 messages takes longer than max.poll.interval.ms (300,000ms / 5 minutes), causing Kafka to evict the consumer from the group and reassign partitions before processing finishes, triggering repeated CommitFailedException errors.",
     "recommendation": "Revert commit 71f0c3aa to reset max-poll-records back to 500, or increase max.poll.interval.ms to match the expected processing duration of larger record batches.",
     "linked_commits": [
      {
       "sha": "71f0c3aa",
       "provider": "unknown",
       "project_id": null
      }
     ],
     "reasoning": "1. I observed cyclic poll timeout warnings and CommitFailedException errors starting at 14:22:00 in order-events-consumer, coinciding with fulfilment warnings regarding missing paid orders.\n2. I checked the commit history and identified commit 71f0c3aa deployed at 14:15:00, which increased max-poll-records tenfold from 500 to 5000.\n3. I confirmed that fetching 5000 records caused the poll loop to exceed max.poll.interval.ms (300s), triggering consumer group rebalances and preventing successful offset commits."
    }
   ],
   "answer": {
    "services": [
     "order-events-consumer"
    ],
    "cause": [
     [
      "poll",
      "max-poll-records",
      "max.poll"
     ],
     [
      "5000",
      "records",
      "rebalanc",
      "interval",
      "processing time"
     ]
    ],
    "blame_sha": "71f0c3aa",
    "wrong_shas": [],
    "max_issues": 2,
    "benign_max": null,
    "decoy_services": []
   },
   "score": {
    "verdict": true,
    "root_cause": true,
    "lenient": true,
    "checks": {
     "detected": true,
     "top service": true,
     "top cause": true,
     "top commit": true,
     "focused": true
    },
    "kind": "incident",
    "alerting": 1,
    "commit_expected": true
   }
  },
  {
   "id": "h05_hpa_cap",
   "set": "held_out",
   "category": "config",
   "name": "Autoscaler capped at 2 replicas during a traffic spike",
   "round": 1,
   "provider": "gemini",
   "model": "gemini-3.6-flash",
   "ai_called": true,
   "error": null,
   "seconds": 98.5,
   "cost_usd": 0.000878,
   "tokens_input": 4989,
   "tokens_output": 1681,
   "issues": [
    {
     "severity": "CRITICAL",
     "confidence": "HIGH",
     "component": "search-api",
     "affected_services": [
      "ingress-nginx"
     ],
     "description": "search-api CPU utilization reached 99% (peak 100%) and incoming requests timed out at ingress-nginx after 30,000ms because the HorizontalPodAutoscaler was capped at maxReplicas: 2.",
     "root_cause": "Commit d3c4b5a6 modified deploy/k8s/search-api-hpa.yaml to lower maxReplicas from 20 to 2. Under traffic, search-api reached its replica cap and could not scale out, causing CPU saturation at 99% and upstream HTTP 110 connection timeouts at ingress-nginx.",
     "recommendation": "Increase maxReplicas in deploy/k8s/search-api-hpa.yaml back to an appropriate limit (e.g., 20) and apply the updated HorizontalPodAutoscaler configuration.",
     "linked_commits": [
      {
       "sha": "d3c4b5a6",
       "provider": "unknown",
       "project_id": null
      }
     ],
     "reasoning": "1. I observed ingress-nginx reporting connection timeouts to search-api while kube-events reported search-api HPA ScalingLimited warnings.\n2. I checked system metrics and trace spans, which showed search-api CPU at 99% and GET /search spans taking 30,000ms.\n3. I reviewed recent commits and identified commit d3c4b5a6 which restricted search-api maxReplicas from 20 to 2, causing pod exhaustion under load."
    }
   ],
   "answer": {
    "services": [
     "search-api"
    ],
    "cause": [
     [
      "replica",
      "hpa",
      "autoscal",
      "scale",
      "scaling"
     ],
     [
      "2",
      "max",
      "cap",
      "limit"
     ]
    ],
    "blame_sha": "d3c4b5a6",
    "wrong_shas": [
     "a0b1c2d3"
    ],
    "max_issues": 2,
    "benign_max": null,
    "decoy_services": []
   },
   "score": {
    "verdict": true,
    "root_cause": true,
    "lenient": true,
    "checks": {
     "detected": true,
     "top service": true,
     "top cause": true,
     "top commit": true,
     "not blamed a0b1c2d": true,
     "focused": true
    },
    "kind": "incident",
    "alerting": 1,
    "commit_expected": true
   }
  },
  {
   "id": "h06_migration_lock",
   "set": "held_out",
   "category": "bad deploy",
   "name": "Migration rewrites a large table and locks it",
   "round": 1,
   "provider": "gemini",
   "model": "gemini-3.6-flash",
   "ai_called": true,
   "error": null,
   "seconds": 31.3,
   "cost_usd": 0.000685,
   "tokens_input": 4872,
   "tokens_output": 1065,
   "issues": [
    {
     "severity": "CRITICAL",
     "confidence": "HIGH",
     "component": "orders-api",
     "affected_services": [],
     "description": "Database queries in orders-api are failing with OperationalError due to statement lock timeouts when acquiring locks on relation orders_order.",
     "root_cause": "Migration 0058_order_total_precision.py introduced in commit 5f6e7d8c alters the total DecimalField on the orders_order table. Applying an ALTER TABLE operation in PostgreSQL on a live table requires an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock, which blocks concurrent database reads and writes from orders-api and causes statement lock timeouts.",
     "recommendation": "Terminate or complete the hanging migration transaction on the database. Execute future column type changes using safe zero-downtime migration techniques (e.g. creating a new column, dual-writing, backfilling, and swapping) or during maintenance windows with strict lock_timeout settings.",
     "linked_commits": [
      {
       "sha": "5f6e7d8c",
       "provider": "unknown",
       "project_id": null
      }
     ],
     "reasoning": "1. I observed multiple OperationalError logs in orders-api indicating statement cancellations due to lock timeouts on relation orders_order starting at 14:13:00.\n2. I examined recent code changes and identified commit 5f6e7d8c merged at 14:08:00, which added migration 0058_order_total_precision.py altering the total field on the Order model.\n3. I confirmed that altering field definitions in PostgreSQL acquires exclusive table locks, directly correlating the commit execution with the database lock timeouts in orders-api."
    }
   ],
   "answer": {
    "services": [
     "orders-api",
     "postgres",
     "orders_order"
    ],
    "cause": [
     [
      "lock",
      "locked",
      "locking"
     ],
     [
      "migration",
      "alter",
      "rewrite",
      "0058"
     ]
    ],
    "blame_sha": "5f6e7d8c",
    "wrong_shas": [],
    "max_issues": 2,
    "benign_max": null,
    "decoy_services": []
   },
   "score": {
    "verdict": true,
    "root_cause": true,
    "lenient": true,
    "checks": {
     "detected": true,
     "top service": true,
     "top cause": true,
     "top commit": true,
     "focused": true
    },
    "kind": "incident",
    "alerting": 1,
    "commit_expected": true
   }
  },
  {
   "id": "h08_rate_limited",
   "set": "held_out",
   "category": "bad deploy",
   "name": "Carrier API rate limit after a polling schedule change",
   "round": 1,
   "provider": "gemini",
   "model": "gemini-3.6-flash",
   "ai_called": true,
   "error": null,
   "seconds": 24.1,
   "cost_usd": 0.000789,
   "tokens_input": 5034,
   "tokens_output": 1370,
   "issues": [
    {
     "severity": "CRITICAL",
     "confidence": "HIGH",
     "component": "shipping-rates",
     "affected_services": [
      "checkout-api"
     ],
     "description": "The shipping-rates service is receiving HTTP 429 Too Many Requests errors from the third-party carrier API due to exceeding rate limits, causing checkout-api to fall back to flat rates.",
     "root_cause": "Commit c1d2e3f4 modified deploy/k8s/rates-refresh-cronjob.yaml to increase the execution frequency from every 15 minutes ('*/15 * * * *') to every minute ('* * * * *'). This frequent polling exhausted the rate limits of https://api.carrier.example/v2/rates, triggering HTTP 429 Too Many Requests responses and degrading checkout-api functionality.",
     "recommendation": "Revert commit c1d2e3f4 in deploy/k8s/rates-refresh-cronjob.yaml back to the 15-minute schedule ('*/15 * * * *') and wait for the rate limit window to reset (Retry-After: 3600 seconds).",
     "linked_commits": [
      {
       "sha": "c1d2e3f4",
       "provider": "unknown",
       "project_id": null
      }
     ],
     "reasoning": "1. I observed HTTP 429 Too Many Requests error logs recurring every minute from the shipping-rates service starting at 14:10:00+00:00.\n2. I noted that checkout-api logged warnings falling back to flat shipping rates as a result of shipping-rates failing.\n3. I checked recent commits and identified commit c1d2e3f4 in deploy/k8s/rates-refresh-cronjob.yaml, which increased the cron execution frequency from every 15 minutes to every 1 minute.\n4. I confirmed that this 15x increase in request frequency exhausted the external carrier API's allowed quota, resulting in persistent 429 rate limiting."
    }
   ],
   "answer": {
    "services": [
     "shipping-rates"
    ],
    "cause": [
     [
      "429",
      "rate limit",
      "rate-limit",
      "too many requests",
      "quota"
     ],
     [
      "schedule",
      "cron",
      "every minute",
      "polling",
      "frequency",
      "15"
     ]
    ],
    "blame_sha": "c1d2e3f4",
    "wrong_shas": [],
    "max_issues": 2,
    "benign_max": null,
    "decoy_services": []
   },
   "score": {
    "verdict": true,
    "root_cause": true,
    "lenient": true,
    "checks": {
     "detected": true,
     "top service": true,
     "top cause": true,
     "top commit": true,
     "focused": true
    },
    "kind": "incident",
    "alerting": 1,
    "commit_expected": true
   }
  },
  {
   "id": "h10_benign_spike",
   "set": "held_out",
   "category": "healthy",
   "name": "Traffic spike absorbed by autoscaling (nothing wrong)",
   "round": 1,
   "provider": "gemini",
   "model": "gemini-3.6-flash",
   "ai_called": true,
   "error": null,
   "seconds": 12.6,
   "cost_usd": 0.000411,
   "tokens_input": 3979,
   "tokens_output": 375,
   "issues": [],
   "answer": {
    "services": [
     "web"
    ],
    "cause": [],
    "blame_sha": null,
    "wrong_shas": [],
    "max_issues": 2,
    "benign_max": "WARNING",
    "decoy_services": []
   },
   "score": {
    "verdict": true,
    "root_cause": true,
    "lenient": true,
    "checks": {
     "silent": true
    },
    "kind": "healthy",
    "alerting": 0,
    "commit_expected": false
   }
  },
  {
   "id": "h11_red_herring",
   "set": "held_out",
   "category": "infrastructure",
   "name": "Rotated SMTP password, next to old unrelated 404 noise",
   "round": 1,
   "provider": "gemini",
   "model": "gemini-3.6-flash",
   "ai_called": true,
   "error": null,
   "seconds": 70.9,
   "cost_usd": 0.000579,
   "tokens_input": 4190,
   "tokens_output": 883,
   "issues": [
    {
     "severity": "CRITICAL",
     "confidence": "HIGH",
     "component": "notifications-svc",
     "affected_services": [],
     "description": "SMTP authentication failures in notifications-svc prevented outbound email processing, leading to an email queue depth backing up to 2210 messages.",
     "root_cause": "Invalid SMTP credentials configured for notifications-svc resulted in SMTPAuthenticationError 535, blocking email dispatch and causing the outbound queue depth to reach 2210 messages with 13-minute delays.",
     "recommendation": "Update the SMTP authentication credentials in the notifications-svc secret store/environment configuration and re-trigger queue delivery.",
     "linked_commits": [],
     "reasoning": "1. I observed repeated smtplib.SMTPAuthenticationError (535 Authentication credentials invalid) errors in notifications-svc starting at 2026-10-18T14:32:00+00:00.\n2. I noticed a warning log at 14:45:00 indicating an email queue depth of 2210 with the oldest message pending for 13 minutes, which exactly matches the 14:32:00 onset of the SMTP authentication failures.\n3. I confirmed that invalid SMTP credentials are actively blocking outbound mail delivery, ruling out network timeouts because the upstream SMTP server explicitly rejected the authentication credentials."
    }
   ],
   "answer": {
    "services": [
     "notifications-svc"
    ],
    "cause": [
     [
      "smtp",
      "email",
      "mail"
     ],
     [
      "credential",
      "password",
      "auth",
      "535",
      "rotat"
     ]
    ],
    "blame_sha": null,
    "wrong_shas": [],
    "max_issues": 2,
    "benign_max": null,
    "decoy_services": [
     "mobile-gateway"
    ]
   },
   "score": {
    "verdict": true,
    "root_cause": true,
    "lenient": true,
    "checks": {
     "detected": true,
     "top service": true,
     "top cause": true,
     "focused": true,
     "no critical on mobile-gateway": true
    },
    "kind": "incident",
    "alerting": 1,
    "commit_expected": false
   }
  },
  {
   "id": "h12_es_watermark",
   "set": "held_out",
   "category": "infrastructure",
   "name": "Elasticsearch disk watermark blocks writes for three services",
   "round": 1,
   "provider": "gemini",
   "model": "gemini-3.6-flash",
   "ai_called": true,
   "error": null,
   "seconds": 25.4,
   "cost_usd": 0.000778,
   "tokens_input": 4627,
   "tokens_output": 1436,
   "issues": [
    {
     "severity": "CRITICAL",
     "confidence": "HIGH",
     "component": "elasticsearch",
     "affected_services": [
      "audit-svc",
      "logging-api",
      "search-api"
     ],
     "description": "Elasticsearch node es-data-2 exceeded its flood stage disk watermark threshold (95% disk usage, 4.1GB free), forcing Elasticsearch to enforce a read-only-allow-delete block on indices hosted on that node. This caused ClusterBlockException write failures across dependent services.",
     "root_cause": "Elasticsearch node 'es-data-2' disk usage reached 95.1% (exceeding the 95% flood stage watermark). To prevent disk corruption, Elasticsearch placed all indices on that node into read-only mode, blocking write requests from logging-api, search-api, and audit-svc with ClusterBlockException.",
     "recommendation": "Free up storage on es-data-2 by deleting obsolete indices or expanding volume capacity. Once free disk space is above the watermark threshold, manually remove the read-only block on affected indices using `PUT /_all/_settings {\"index.blocks.read_only_allow_delete\": null}`.",
     "linked_commits": [],
     "reasoning": "1. I observed elasticsearch log warnings indicating node es-data-2 exceeded its 95% flood stage watermark, immediately followed by ClusterBlockException errors in logging-api, search-api, and audit-svc.\n2. I evaluated recent commit f1e2d3c4 but ruled it out as it only modified CSS button styling (web/styles/buttons.css).\n3. I confirmed that the cluster-wide write failures directly originated from Elasticsearch enforcing its built-in read-only block due to storage exhaustion on node es-data-2."
    }
   ],
   "answer": {
    "services": [
     "elasticsearch",
     "es-data-2"
    ],
    "cause": [
     [
      "disk",
      "watermark",
      "flood"
     ],
     [
      "read-only",
      "read only",
      "readonly",
      "block"
     ]
    ],
    "blame_sha": null,
    "wrong_shas": [
     "f1e2d3c4"
    ],
    "max_issues": 2,
    "benign_max": null,
    "decoy_services": []
   },
   "score": {
    "verdict": true,
    "root_cause": true,
    "lenient": true,
    "checks": {
     "detected": true,
     "top service": true,
     "top cause": true,
     "not blamed f1e2d3c": true,
     "focused": true
    },
    "kind": "incident",
    "alerting": 1,
    "commit_expected": false
   }
  }
 ]
}